No. 11-11021
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________________________________________________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
BY AND THROUGH ATTORNEY GENERAL PAM BONDI, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
__________________________________________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA (NO. 3:10-91 (RV))
__________________________________________________________________
BRIEF FOR PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS,
KAJ AHLBURG, AND MARY BROWN
__________________________________________________________________
KAREN R. HARNED
Executive Director
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS
SMALL BUSINESS LEGAL CENTER
1201 F St. N.W., Suite 200
Washington, DC 20004
RANDY E. BARNETT
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
600 New Jersey Ave. N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
Of Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee NFIB

MICHAEL A. CARVIN
GREGORY G. KATSAS
Counsel of Record
C. KEVIN MARSHALL
HASHIM M. MOOPPAN
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Ave. N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 879-3939
ggkatsas@jonesday.com

Counsel for Private Plaintiffs-Appellees

State of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1, the undersigned counsel certifies that
Plaintiffs-Appellees Kaj Ahlburg and Mary Brown are individual, non-corporate
parties and that Plaintiff-Appellee National Federation of Independent Business
(“NFIB”) is a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation that promotes and protects the
rights of its members to own, operate, and grown their small businesses across the
fifty States and the District of Columbia.

NFIB is not a publicly traded

corporation, issues no stock, and has no parent corporation. There is no publiclyheld corporation with more than a 10% ownership stake in NFIB.
Undersigned counsel further certifies that, in addition to the persons and
entities listed in the Brief for Appellants, the following persons, firms, and
associations may have an interest in the outcome of this case, and that to the best of
his knowledge, the list of persons and entities in the Brief for Appellants is
otherwise complete:
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
Barnett, Randy E.
Carvin, Michael A.
Clement, Paul
Marshall, C. Kevin
Mooppan, Hashim M.
C-1 of 9

State of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021
AMICI CURIAE
Adler, Matthew
Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians
Alexander, Janet Cooper
All Indian Pueblo Council
Allen, Michael P.
Altman, Stuart
American Cancer Society
American Cancer Society Action Network
American Diabetes Association
American Heart Association
Andrews, Robert E.
Balkin, Jack M.
Baucus, Max
Becerra, Xavier
Bristol Bay Area Health Corporation
Brown, Rebecca L.
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
Change to Win
Chemerinsky, Erwin

C-2 of 9

State of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021
Chickasaw Nation
Choper, Jesse H.
Clyburn, James E.
Colby, Thomas B.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by and through Martha Coakley,
Attorney General
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation
Consolidated Tribal Health Project, Inc.
Conyers, John Jr.
Copeland, Charlton
Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments
Dingell, John D.
Dorf, Michael C.
Durbin, Dick
Elliott, Heather
Farber, Daniel
Friedman, Barry
Frost, Amanda
Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s Association
Harkin, Tom
Hessick, Andy
C-3 of 9

State of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021
Holahan, John F.
Hoyer, Steny H.
Kalb, Johanna
Kickapoo Traditional Tribes of Texas
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho
Larson, John B.
Leahy, Patrick
Levin, Sander M.
Lytton Rancheria of California
Maniilaq Association
Marshall, William P.
Metlakatla Indian Community
Metzger, Gillian E.
Mikulski, Barbara
Miller, George
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
Missouri Attorney General
Morrison, Trevor W.
Mulligan, Lumen N.
Murray, Patty

C-4 of 9

State of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021
Nadler, Jerrold
National Congress of American Indians
National Indian Health Board
Nez Pierce Tribe
Nichol, Gene
Northern Valley Indian Health, Inc.
Northwest Portland Area Indian Health Board
Norton Sound Health Corporation
Novak, William J.
Office of the Missouri Attorney General
Pala Band of Luiseno Mission Indians
Pallone, Frank Jr.
Patrick, Deval L. (Governor of Massachusetts)
Pelosi, Nancy
Pildes, Richard H.
Primus, Richard A.
Purcell, Jr., Edward A.
Reid, Harry
Resnik, Judith
Roberts, Caprice L.

C-5 of 9

State of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021
Rockefeller, John D. IV
Rosenthal, Meredith
Ruger, Theodore W.
Schapiro, Robert A.
Schumer, Charles
Seminole Tribe of Florida
Service Employees International Union
Shapiro, David L.
Sherry, Suzanna
Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe
Siegel, Neil S.
Smith, Peter J.
Stark, Fortney Pete
State of Missouri, by and through Chris Koster, Attorney General
Suquamish Indian Tribe
Susanville Indian Rancheria
The National Indian Health Board
United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc.
Vladick, Stephen I.
Walsh, Kevin C.

C-6 of 9

State of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021
Wasserman, Howard M.
Waxman, Henry A.
Wells, Michael L.
Winkler, Adam
Yerrington Paiute Tribe
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE
Blalack, K. Lee
Bland, Frank Paul Jr.
Boyle, Brian
Chavez & Gertler
Codispoti, Lisa
Cohen, Stuart R.
Conrad, Robin S.
Deahl, Joshua
Dellinger, III., Walter Estes
Frank, Theodore
Haghighat, Aarash
Hart, Melissa
Hirth, Andrew J.
Horton, Philip W.

C-7 of 9

State of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021
Hughes, Paul W.
Greenberg, Marcia D.
Kamiat, Walter
Kawka, Shane B.
Kimberly, Michael B.
K&L Gates LLP
Kry, Robert K.
Lamken, Jeffrey A.
Longstreth, John
Martin, Emily J.
Mayer Brown LLP
Metzger, Gillian E.
Mills, John Stewart
MoloLamken LLP
Morgan, Jeremiah J.
Morrison, Trevor W.
O’Melveny & Meyers LLP
Philo, Gregory J.
Pincus, Andrew J.
Pitts, P. Casey

C-8 of 9

State of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021
Powell, H. Jefferson
Rothfeld, Charles A.
Rouvelas, Mary P.
Schneider, Mark
Scott, Judith A.
Stephan, John Michael
Strommer, Geoffrey D.
Suda, Molly
Sung, Jennifer
Szymanski, Patrick J.
Thorpe, Michael D.
Totaro, Martin V.
Walker, Lucas M.
Waxman, Judith G.
Weisbard, Ariel Zev
Weissglass, Jonathan

/s/ Gregory G. Katsas
GREGORY G. KATSAS
Counsel for Private Plaintiffs-Appellees

C-9 of 9

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
This Court has scheduled this case for oral argument before a three-judge
panel on June 8, 2011, in Atlanta, Georgia.
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xiv

RESTATEMENT OF FACTS
The Government describes selected aspects of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (collectively, the “Act” or “ACA”); however, it omits many
facts that, while not critical to analyzing the individual mandate’s constitutionality,
are essential to understanding its full purpose and effect.
1.

Contrary to the ACA’s stated purpose of making healthcare

“affordable,” the Act’s provisions regulating insurers substantially increase their
costs. Congress required “guaranteed-issue” coverage—i.e., coverage for those
with pre-existing health conditions.

42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a).

It

required “community-rated” premiums—i.e., premiums reflecting only average
healthcare costs, but (with limited exceptions) not individual characteristics better
reflecting actuarial risk. Id. § 300gg. And it also banned other restrictions on the
scope (and thus expense) of insurance—e.g., monetary coverage limits, id. §
300gg-11, and exclusions for certain services, id. § 300gg-13. Congress thus
effectively required insurance to be offered at average rates for any individual, no
matter how sick, and to cover limitless amounts of healthcare. Unsurprisingly,
those requirements will raise insurance costs in the individual market by 27 to 30

1

percent. 1
2.

To counteract that inflation, Congress heeded the insurance industry’s

lobbying to impose an individual insurance mandate. 2 With limited exceptions, the
mandate requires that every American obtain “minimum essential coverage,” with
compliance enforced through a monthly monetary penalty. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.
This mandate subsidizes insurers for two related reasons.
First, it generally subsidizes insurers for the avowed purpose of enabling
them to lower premiums for their voluntary customers.

The mandate forces

“millions of new customers [in]to the health insurance market,” 42 U.S.C. §
18091(a)(2)(C), which increases the quantity of the insurer’s customers and its
revenue base. More importantly, the individuals forced to purchase insurance are
profitable customers, because they are primarily “healthy individuals” (id. §
18091(a)(2)(I) (emphasis added)) who have sensibly decided that insurance is not
financially worthwhile. The mandate is neither needed nor designed to capture
sick or poor people. Unhealthy individuals will voluntarily purchase insurance

1

CBO, An Analysis of Health Insurance Premiums Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 6 (Nov. 30, 2009) (“CBO, Premiums”), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10781/11-30-Premiums.pdf.
2

E.g., Addressing Insurance Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health,
Education, Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (submission of Ronald A.
Williams, Chairman & CEO, Aetna, Inc.) (“Since 2005, we at Aetna have been
speaking out in support of an individual coverage requirement….”).
2

under the Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions. 3 Likewise,
impoverished individuals will be covered by the Act’s expansion of Medicaid
eligibility for people below 133% of the poverty-line (covering 16-17 million
uninsured), 4 and by its subsidized participation in state health-insurance exchanges
for people between 133% and 400% of the poverty-line (covering 19 million
uninsured). 5 U.S. Br. 14. Moreover, the mandate’s penalty is inapplicable if an
individual’s insurance costs would exceed 8% of income or otherwise be deemed a
“hardship.” 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e). Accordingly, the mandate targets healthy
individuals who can afford insurance but believe that its cost is not financially
worthwhile given their infrequent healthcare needs. 6
Conscripting these customers will greatly increase the premiums collected
by insurers relative to the payouts required. That is why the mandate lowers prices
3

CBO, Premiums, 19 (“[I]n the absence of [the mandate], people who are older
and more likely to use medical care would be more likely to enroll in nongroup
plans” than “people who are younger and expect to use less medical care.”).
4

CBO, Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010, 18
(March 30, 2011) (“CBO, Analysis”), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121
xx/doc12119/03-30-HealthCareLegislation.pdf.
5

CBO, Analysis, 14, 19.

6

CBO, Effects of Eliminating the Individual Mandate to Obtain Health Insurance,
2 (June 16, 2010) (“CBO, Effects”), available at, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113
xx/doc11379/Eliminate_Individual_Mandate_06_16.pdf (“[T]he elimination of the
mandate would reduce insurance coverage among healthier people to a greater
degree than it would reduce coverage among less healthy people.”); AARP Amicus
Br. 28 (“Without the minimum coverage provision … young healthy individuals
would opt out of coverage.”).
3

for voluntary customers, inverting the normal economic axiom that increased
demand drives prices up. AARP Amicus Br. 27-28 (Because “[p]rivate health
coverage products ‘pool’ the risk of high health care costs across a large number of
people, … [the] risk-spreading function [of compelled participation by healthy
individuals] helps make the cost of health care reasonably affordable for most
people.”). Specifically, the mandate will lower premiums by 15-20%, eliminating
two-thirds of the increase caused by the Act’s provisions regulating insurers. 7 This
is a subsidy of between $28 billion and $39 billion in 2016 alone. 8
Second, the mandate specifically counteracts the costs to insurers from the
guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
Having forced insurers to contract disadvantageously with individuals who are
sick, Congress prevented “free-riders” from “taking advantage” of that
entitlement—i.e., from waiting to purchase insurance until sick—by preemptively
compelling them to contract disadvantageously with insurers while still healthy.
U.S. Br. 17-18, 28-29.
Remarkably, neither Congress nor any federal agency appears to have
estimated the frequency or cost of such “free-riding.” Instead, the Government
7

CBO, Effects, 2.

8

The average premium in the individual market will be $5,800 after the 15-20%
reduction, which means the mandate will have lowered premiums by $1,024 to
$1,450 for each of the 27 million voluntary participants, or $28 to $39 billion.
CBO, Premiums, 6; CBO, Effects, 2.
4

observes that uncompensated healthcare is generally a significant concern, without
identifying the amount that those affected by the mandate contribute to “costshifting,” much less the extent to which the ACA’s insurance provisions (or other
federal laws) exacerbate that problem.

Id. 1-2, 10-11, 26-27.

But the

Government’s own evidence confirms the mandate is targeted toward individuals
who rarely obtain healthcare and mostly pay when they do.
On the threshold question whether the uninsured even receive healthcare, the
Government emphasizes that “80% of those without insurance at some point
during a 12-month period visited a doctor or emergency room at least once.” Id.
10-11. But the vast majority of those visits occur when the individual is insured,
and only 57% of the full-year uninsured visit the doctor or emergency room. 9
Moreover, obtaining healthcare while uninsured only “cost-shifts” if the care
is uncompensated.

Yet even the mandate’s proponents acknowledge that the

uninsured on average obtain no uncompensated care from non-emergency
providers and pay more than the insured for non-emergency services. 10 As for
emergency care, less than 20% of the full-year uninsured visit emergency rooms,
which is the only place where federal law requires that the indigent receive
9

Kaiser Commission, Covering the Uninsured in 2008, 11 (Aug. 2008), available
at http://kff.org/uninsured/upload/7809.pdf; CDC, Health, United States, 2009, 318
(2010) (“CDC, Health”), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus09.pdf.
10

Jonathan Gruber & David Rodriquez, How Much Uncompensated Care Do
Doctors Provide?, 26 J. Health Econ. 1151, 1159-61 (2007).
5

(limited, “stabilizing”) care. 11
Furthermore, the pre-Act levels of uncompensated healthcare reveal virtually
nothing about the amount of such care that would have been received by the
individuals affected by the mandate. The sick and poor uninsured who received
the overwhelming majority of pre-Act uncompensated care will no longer be
uninsured post-Act. See supra at 2-3. This is why only 8 million of the 52 million
now uninsured will be affected by the mandate. 12
In short, the Government’s conflation of the uninsured affected by the
mandate with the uninsured receiving uncompensated care ignores the critical fact
that the mandate affects uninsured individuals who are highly unlikely to obtain
significant uncompensated care in a given year, let alone in every month for which
the mandate penalizes them. The mandate thus targets a subclass of the uninsured
representing a small fraction of the trumpeted $43 billion in uncompensated care.
U.S. Br. 1-2.

Moreover, since roughly 4 million of the 8 million uninsured

affected by the mandate will likely pay the penalty rather than purchase
insurance, 13 the risk of “free-riding” will substantially persist regardless.
11

CDC, Health, 337; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.

12

CBO, Payments of Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the Patient Protection
and Afforable Care Act, 1 (April 30, 2010) (“CBO, Payments”), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/Individual_Mandate_Penalties-0430.pdf; CBO, Analysis, 18.
13

CBO, Payments, 1.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The ACA imposes an extraordinary duty on Americans to enter into costly
and unwanted health-insurance contracts. That mandate lacks any foundation in
constitutional text or precedent. By conscripting citizens to subsidize voluntary
participants in the insurance industry, it exemplifies the threat to individual liberty
when Congress exceeds its enumerated powers and attempts to wield a plenary
police power.
The mandate’s command to uninsured individuals who are engaging in no
commercial activity cannot be justified as permissible Commerce Clause
regulation. Compelling the uninsured to participate in the commerce of health
insurance does not regulate that commerce.

Likewise, the status of being

uninsured is not a class of economic activities that may be regulated due to its
“substantial effect” on commerce. Any argument that the uninsured “affect” the
insurance market through their non-participation is foreclosed by precedent and
would eliminate all limits on Congressional power.
Nor can the mandate be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause as
an appropriate incidental means of “carrying into execution” the Act’s regulation
of insurers. It is not “necessary” because, rather than serving the legitimate end of
eliminating barriers to the execution of the ACA’s regulation—i.e., ensuring
complete compliance with that regulation—the mandate at best furthers the
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illegitimate end of counteracting the negative effects on insurers after the
regulation is fully executed.

Accepting that goal as a legitimate end would

eliminate all constraints on Congress. Moreover, the mandate is not “proper”
given its unprecedented and oppressive nature—i.e., forcing economically
disadvantageous contracts on unwilling individuals to subsidize third parties in
traditional areas of state regulation.
The Government’s principal argument attempts to recharacterize the
mandate as a regulation of the economic activity of obtaining healthcare while
uninsured. But the mandate does not regulate that commercial practice. Rather, it
regulates the status of being uninsured, regardless of whether healthcare is
obtained, let alone obtained without compensation. It is legally irrelevant that
some sub-class of the uninsured will receive uncompensated care, for Congress
cannot bootstrap from that proscribable practice to the substantially broader class
of uninsured individuals who do not engage in it.
The Government also attempts to recharacterize the mandate as a “tax.” But
the ACA’s text and longstanding precedent make clear that fining the uninsured for
violating a statutory duty to be insured is not a tax, but a regulatory command
enforced by a penalty. Moreover, Congress unambiguously disavowed its taxing
power when enacting the mandate.
Finally, the mandate’s unconstitutionality requires invalidating the entire
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ACA. The Act is a sprawling and complex legislative bargain, and at the heart of
that compromise is the mandate and related insurance regulations that even the
Government concedes cannot survive without it. Congress would never have
enacted the ACA without these core provisions.
ARGUMENT
As the CBO noted, the ACA’s “mandate requiring all individuals to
purchase health insurance [is] an unprecedented form of federal action.” RE 2039.
It is thus hardly surprising that no judicial precedent supports the federal
imposition of a freestanding duty on citizens to purchase unwanted commercial
products.

As the district court correctly held, “[n]ever before has Congress

required that everyone buy a product from a private company (essentially for life)
just for being alive and residing in the United States,” and such an exercise of
sovereign power “is without logical limitation and far exceeds the existing legal
boundaries established by Supreme Court precedent.”

Id. 2039, 2057.

Accordingly, the Government bears a heavy burden to explain why existing
precedent delimiting Congress’ power to regulate commerce should be expanded
to uphold Congress’ decision, for the first time in our Nation’s history, to compel
individuals who are not participating in commercial activity to purchase a costly
product they neither need nor want.
The Government fails to meet that burden, and hardly even tries. Instead, its
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principal argument is that the mandate regulates the commercial activity of
obtaining healthcare without insurance.

But the Government defends a

hypothetical statute; in fact, the mandate regulates the status of being uninsured,
whether or not an individual obtains healthcare, let alone “free-rides” by obtaining
uncompensated care that gives rise to “cost-shifting.”
Thus, as we demonstrate below, the Act’s actual mandate that virtually all
Americans must purchase health insurance is contrary to first principles and
controlling precedent, and this fundamental constitutional infirmity cannot be
cured by mischaracterizing the mandate as a regulation of the practice of obtaining
healthcare while uninsured.
I.

THE
CONSTITUTION
ESTABLISHES
A
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT WITH LIMITED AND ENUMERATED POWERS
TO PROTECT INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
“The powers delegated by the … Constitution to the federal government are

few and defined,” whereas “[t]hose which … remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). The
Commerce Clause, for example, “was intended as a negative and preventive
provision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to
be used for the positive purposes of the General Government.” W. Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994). Similarly, the Necessary and Proper
Clause was “not itself a grant of power, but a caveat that the Congress possesses
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all the means necessary to carry out [its] specifically granted … powers.” Kinsella
v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960). To be sure, “the great
changes that ha[ve] occurred in the way business [is] carried on” have “greatly
expanded the … authority of Congress” under these Clauses. Lopez, 514 U.S. at
556. But appeals to “our complex society” can never be allowed to “effectually
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government,” id. at 557, because “the Founders denied the
National Government” a “plenary police power” and instead “reposed [it] in the
States,” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
Preserving “our Government’s federal structure” is essential, “not [to]
protect the sovereignty of [the] States … as abstract political entities,” but “for the
protection of individuals.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
“[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power,” id., because “a healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. “[T]he Constitution … divides power among
sovereigns … precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power
in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.” Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
Such threats to individual liberty are especially acute when centralized
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federal regulation elides the “deeply rooted” “difference … between ‘misfeasance’
and ‘nonfeasance’—[i.e.,] between [an individual’s] active misconduct working
positive injury to others and [his] passive inaction or … failure to take steps to
protect them from harm.” Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, 373 (5th ed.
1984).

Mandates directly “forcing men to help one another” more tightly

circumscribe their “freedom” of “choice” than do regulations merely restricting
“the commission of affirmative acts of harm.” Id.; RE 2039. Such mandates
threaten a fundamental principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence: “[l]et a man
… be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vitious in his practice[;] provided he
keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules of public
decency, he is out of the reach of human laws.” St. George Tucker, 2 Blackstone’s
Commentaries, 124 (1803). Accordingly, the only free-standing federal mandates
ever imposed on individuals have been expressly grounded in the Constitution’s
text and have constituted traditional duties of citizenship. E.g., Selective Draft
Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 377, 386-90 (1918) (upholding the military draft as a
“supreme and noble duty” sanctioned by Congress’ power “[t]o raise … armies”
and by historical practice).
Even more suspect are mandates that “take[] property from A. and give[] it
to B.” Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). In the
Framers’ generation, the Supreme Court thought it “against all reason and justice”
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to “presume[]” that the “people [have] entrust[ed] [the] Legislature” to force such
private subsidization, id., and further described such mandates not only as
“contrary both to the letter and spirit of the Constitution,” but as “monster[s] in
legislation [that] shock all mankind,” Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 304, 310 (1795). That extreme judicial skepticism persists to this day. E.g.,
E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
Yet here, the ACA’s mandate invades the States’ traditional protection of
their citizens’ health and welfare, compelling unwilling individuals to enter into
economically disadvantageous contracts to subsidize the insurance industry and its
voluntary customers.

The Constitution does not authorize this intrusive and

onerous exercise of a plenary police power.
II.

FORCING INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE
IS NOT A REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Congress may “regulate Commerce … among the several States.” U.S.

Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

Under controlling precedent, there are “three broad

categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power”: (1)
“the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; (2) the operation of “the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce”; and (3) “those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.”

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; accord

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005). But none of those “categories of
activity” encompasses the inactivity regulated by the mandate—i.e., the non13

purchase of health insurance. 14
A.

The Mandate Does Not Regulate Commerce Itself, In Either Its
Interstate Or Intrastate Channels Or Instrumentalities

The interstate “commerce” that Congress may regulate is “commercial
intercourse.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824); see also
Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1783) (“Johnson”)
(defining “commerce” as “[e]xchange of one thing for another; trade; traffick,” or
“intercourse”). That “include[s] … businesses in which persons b[uy] and s[ell],
[or] bargain[] and contract[],” such as “insurance.”

United States v. Se.

Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944). And Congress “regulate[s]” that
“commercial intercourse” by “prescribing rules for carrying [it] on.” Gibbons, 22
U.S. at 189-90. Congress thus may regulate the “channels” and “instrumentalities”
of interstate commerce, “since they are the ingredients of interstate commerce
itself.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Specifically,
Congress “may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” such as
by “keep[ing] th[ose] channels … free from immoral and injurious uses,” and it
may regulate the operation of the “persons or things” that are “the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce,” such as by establishing safety standards on railroads used
14

Although the “substantial effects” category is best understood as “deriv[ing]
from the Necessary and Proper Clause,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see infra at 16-17, 32, the proper derivation is
immaterial here, because the mandate falls outside the category regardless.
14

in interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. In short, the Commerce Clause
empowers Congress to set the rules for those who engage in the activity of
commercial intercourse.
But the non-purchase of health insurance is not “commerce,” and the
mandate is not “regulating” commerce. An individual’s decision not to “bargain[]
and contract[]” for insurance (Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 539) is not
“commercial intercourse.” That inactivity is the absence of intercourse. Likewise,
the mandate does not “regulate” the ingredients of the commerce in insurance by
“prescrib[ing] the rule by which [they are] to be governed.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at
553. It regulates neither the terms of insurance contracts nor the parties to such
contracts. Rather, it commandeers individuals who are not participating in that
commerce and forces them to enter into such contracts for the benefit of existing
commercial participants.
Compelling commerce—i.e., punishing individuals for their commercial
inactivity—is not regulating commerce. Although Congress may, for example,
regulate the terms of voluntary contracts between General Motors and its
customers, it may not compel individuals to enter into purchase contracts with GM,
because there is no pre-existing “commerce” to regulate. Otherwise, Congress
could force individuals to purchase literally any product, from GM cars to Citibank
mortgages to broccoli. Any factual uniqueness in the health-insurance market
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would be irrelevant if compelling commerce qualified as regulating commerce,
since Congress, “[w]hatever [its] motive and purpose,” has “plenary power” over
“regulations of commerce.” United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
Unsurprisingly, then, not even the Government contends that the non-purchase of
insurance is “commerce” “regulated” by the mandate.
B.

The Mandate Does Not Regulate A Class Of Economic Activities
That Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce

The Government does suggest that merely being uninsured “substantially
affects” interstate commerce and thus falls within Congress’ commerce power.
U.S. Br. 16, 24. That suggestion is at war with the Constitution’s plain language,
the Supreme Court’s “substantial effects” precedent, and the entire concept of
enumerated powers.
1.

The Scope and Limits of the “Substantial Effects” Doctrine

It is important to understand why Congress may “regulate purely local
activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. Congress’ enumerated
power to regulate “interstate commerce” does not confer power to regulate “things
affecting interstate commerce” as such, because the class of “things affecting
interstate commerce” is distinct from (and exponentially broader than) “interstate
commerce” itself. Rather, Congress may regulate intrastate activities affecting
interstate commerce solely to effectuate the execution of its enumerated power to
16

regulate interstate commerce. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118-20 & n.3 (citing McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)); United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942). Congress thus can “adopt measures … [that]
foster, protect, control, [or] restrain” interstate commerce, by removing intrastate
“burdens and obstructions” on desirable interstate commerce and by restricting
intrastate “activities” that promote undesirable interstate commerce. NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937); accord Raich, 545 U.S. at
35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he commerce power permits
Congress … to facilitate interstate commerce by eliminating potential
obstructions[] and to restrict it by eliminating potential stimulants.”).
A common barrier to Congress’ goals for interstate commerce occurs where
the aggregate effect of a product’s local use adversely “influence[s] [the] price and
market conditions” desired by Congress. E.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-19, 25-28;
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942). For “interstate commerce … to
be effectively controlled” (Darby, 312 U.S. at 121), Congress must regulate goods
at the intrastate level, because that local commerce is “commingled with” (id.), or
otherwise “in competition with” (Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 120), interstate
commerce, and because of the “enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing
between [a good] [produced] locally [versus] elsewhere,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
Relatedly, Congress need not “excise, as trivial, individual instances” of local
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activity that are each of “de minimis character,” but substantial when aggregated.
Id. at 17, 23.

Thus, because local and national products are fungible, the

“substantial effects” doctrine essentially eliminates the distinction between
intrastate and interstate commerce, allowing regulation of the former to avoid
impeding regulation of the latter.
Wickard and Raich demonstrate this point. In Wickard, Congress, while
attempting to increase wheat prices in interstate commerce, restricted the amount
of wheat that farmers could grow, even if only for personal consumption. 317 U.S.
at 113-15, 127-29. The Court upheld that restriction, reasoning that local wheat
production would obstruct Congress’ goal of raising interstate prices, because local
production would reduce prices, both by increasing the supply of wheat that
potentially could be sold interstate and by decreasing the demand for purchasing
wheat interstate. Id. at 127-29. Likewise, in Raich, Congress’ attempt to eliminate
the interstate market for marijuana was obstructed by the intrastate manufacture
and possession of state-law-authorized “medical” marijuana, which still could be
diverted into the proscribed interstate market and which also created difficulties in
enforcing the interstate prohibition. 545 U.S. at 17-22, 25-32; accord United
States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1216-18 (11th Cir. 2006) (possession of child
pornography).
Countless “substantial effects” cases involve the same commercial
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dynamic—i.e., local instances of the commercial activity regulated at the interstate
level, where the aggregate local effect undermines Congress’ preferred interstate
market conditions. 15 Other “substantial effects” cases involve burdens on interstate
commerce of a different type—i.e., local activity impeding the free interstate flow
of products desired by Congress. 16 Critically, however, no “substantial effects”
case has upheld regulation of individuals who neither participate in commerce nor
pose barriers to commerce.
To the contrary, in Lopez and Morrison, the Court clarified that even some
barriers to commerce may not be regulated under the “substantial effects”
doctrine.

Specifically, Lopez invalidated a law banning gun possession near

schools, and Morrison invalidated a law providing civil remedies for violence
against women, even though those activities undoubtedly had substantial
deleterious effects on the Nation’s commercial productivity. Lopez, 514 U.S. at
551, 563-64; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02, 614-15. Nevertheless, the Court
invalidated the laws attacking those barriers to commerce, because the regulated
individuals had not brought themselves within Congress’ regulatory ambit. Lopez,
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E.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353-54 (1914) (local railroad rates);
Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 118-21 (local milk prices); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 188-90 (1968) (local wages).
16

E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-58 (1964)
(racial discrimination by certain public accommodations); Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 154-56 (1971) (loan sharking).
19

514 U.S. at 566-68; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-19. Specifically, they had not
engaged in any “economic activity” resembling the type of “commerce” that
Congress could regulate at the interstate level—i.e., the “sort of economic
endeavor” (Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611) that “arise[s] out of or [is] connected with a
commercial transaction” (Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
The Court explained that “the implication[] of” allowing Congress to
regulate noneconomic activities based on their aggregate commercial effects would
make it “difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,” because virtually
“any activity by an individual” could be “related to … economic productivity.” Id.
at 563-64, 567-68. Yet Congress’ commerce power could not be permitted to
“effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local,”
id. at 557, for “the Founders denied the National Government … a plenary police
power,” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
Accordingly, there are three related reasons why the “substantial effects”
doctrine does not authorize Congress to force Americans to buy health insurance:
first, the “substantial effect” of not participating in commerce is not a barrier to
commerce; second, such non-participation is not “economic activity”; and third,
expanding the doctrine to encompass the non-purchase of insurance would create
plenary federal power.
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2.

Non-Participation In The Commerce Of Health Insurance
Is Not An Activity Obstructing Or Burdening That
Commerce

In contrast to the regulated entities in the “substantial effects” cases—i.e.,
persons whose intrastate economic activities adversely affected Congress’
preferred market conditions for interstate commerce by imposing “burdens and
obstructions” (Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 336) or by creating “potential
stimulants” (Raich, 545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment))—the
uninsured are strangers to the health-insurance market who in no way stimulate or
obstruct its operation. Far from “affecting” that commerce, the uninsured have
avoided it completely, leaving Congress entirely free to impose its desired
regulations on willing buyers and sellers.
Because market non-participants impose no barriers to establishing and
enforcing the “rule[s] by which [interstate] commerce is to be governed” (Lopez,
514 U.S. at 553), regulating them cannot be justified as a prophylactic execution of
Congress’ commerce power.

Unlike participants in intrastate commerce who

interfere with Congress’ goals for interstate commerce, the uninsured’s defining
characteristic is that they do not participate in the commerce of insurance at all,
and so they impede neither market participants from contracting for insurance nor
Congress from regulating that voluntary commerce. Thus, the “substantial effects”
doctrine cannot reach the uninsured: while it effectively eliminates the distinction
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between national and local commerce, it does not eliminate the distinction between
commerce and non-commerce, or between regulating and compelling commerce.
Wickard illustrates this fundamental point.

Although the “substantial

effects” doctrine authorized restricting Filburn’s intrastate wheat production,
Congress did not impose, and the Court did not approve, a mandate that Filburn
and his neighbors buy or produce wheat. See 317 U.S. at 113-15, 127-29. More
colorfully, whereas the “substantial effects” doctrine would allow Congress to
regulate local bootleggers because of their aggregate effect on the interstate liquor
market, the uninsured “affect” the health-insurance market only as a teetotaler
affects the liquor market, and the power to regulate bootleggers does not imply the
power to conscript teetotalers.
That inactivity falls outside the doctrine is no mere “formalistic”
“distinction[],” but the essence of “economic practicality.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 569,
571 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Given that Congress indisputably cannot compel
unwilling consumers to engage in commercial purchases by claiming to regulate
the “ingredients” of commerce, see supra Part II.A, Congress cannot be permitted
to compel such commerce by semantically recharacterizing its claim as eliminating
the “effect” of such non-purchases.
That is particularly true here, because the mandated insurance is
economically disadvantageous for the compelled purchasers.
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Surely Congress

could not force urban pedestrians to purchase car insurance on the theory that their
refusal to do so had a burdensome effect on the car-insurance market because they
were “adversely selecting” out of that “risk pool.” That would be as absurd as
saying that voters “burden” political participation by refusing to make campaign
contributions (or to pay candidates’ government-imposed filing fees). Cf. Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“refusal” of government “to subsidize” an
activity does not “interfere with [it]”). Indeed, if Congress reduced insurance
premiums by requiring that the uninsured simply donate $5000 to insurers, it could
not possibly argue that their prior “failure” to donate was negatively “affecting”
commerce.

But there is no economic difference between compelled $5000

donations to insurers and compelled insurance contracts that cost $5000 more than
the insured’s actuarial risk in self-financing his healthcare.

It thus is the

Government that evades substantive constitutional principles through formalism.
Moreover, it is irrelevant for “substantial effects” purposes that insurers
want subsidies to offset losses stemming from the ACA’s requirements to insure
sick individuals. Market non-participants do not negatively “affect” commerce
simply because sellers’ woes are attributable to costly government regulation
rather than normal free-market conditions. The non-participants are not harming
the insurance market; they simply are not ameliorating the government’s own
market interference.
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Thus, when Congress found that “[t]he individual [mandate]” will
“substantially affect[] interstate commerce,” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(1), it reversed
the relevant inquiry. The question is not whether Congress’ regulation positively
affects interstate commerce—that answer is pre-ordained, because Congress has
“plenary power” over such commerce, and courts cannot second-guess its
“conception of public policy.” Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. Rather, the question is
whether the regulated individuals are negatively affecting commerce, such that
there is a legitimate predicate justifying “the exertion of the power of Congress
over [them].” Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 119.
Lopez and Morrison underscore this point. The federal laws there affected
commerce by banning local activities that harmed commerce, but the laws were
still invalid because the local activities were not “economic activities” resembling
the “commerce” that could be directly regulated at the interstate level. See supra at
19-20.

It inexorably follows that the mandate’s presumptively beneficial

commercial effect is insufficient to regulate the uninsured’s inactivity, which
concededly is not “commerce” reachable at the interstate level and which does not
even “affect” market participants or Congress’ regulation of those participants.
Indeed, the Government concedes that the regulated individuals do not
engage in commerce when declining to purchase insurance, even though the
purchasing mandated by the Act is commerce.
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But by the same token, the

regulated individuals do not affect commerce when declining to purchase
insurance, even though the purchasing mandated by the Act affects commerce.
3.

Inactivity In The Commerce Of Health Insurance Is
“Noneconomic”

Inactivity in the health-insurance market also falls outside the “substantial
effects” doctrine because it is “noneconomic.” The non-purchase of insurance is
not “the production, distribution, [or] consumption of commodities” or services,
which is the Court’s definition of “[e]conomics.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26. More
fundamentally, being uninsured, like all other inactivity, is not an “economic
endeavor” (Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611), or an “activit[y] that arise[s] out of or [is]
connected with a commercial transaction” (Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
Indeed, the non-purchase of insurance is less “connected with a commercial
transaction” than was the gun possession in Lopez. After all, “commodities” like
guns can be possessed only after being “produc[ed], distribut[ed], and [acquired]”
through commercial transactions. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25. Notably, Lopez himself
was a paid gun courier. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993).
As his “possession of a gun in a local school zone” was nevertheless deemed “in
no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, the
same conclusion necessarily follows for the uninsured’s inactivity, which
continues their estrangement from the insurance market and thus leaves them even
25

more “remote” from commerce than was Lopez, id. at 557.
Although Congress characterized that inactivity as an “economic …
decision” not to purchase, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A), the Government has
abandoned its defense below (RE 2053-57) of this semantic gamesmanship. Relabeling “inactivity” as a “decision” to be inactive cannot change the fact that no
“economic activity” has occurred. To be sure, consumers’ aggregated “economic
decisions” not to purchase a product—whether wheat, liquor, GM cars, Citibank
mortgages, or health insurance—always “substantially affect” that product-market
relative to the contrary “economic decisions” compelled by Congress. But, again,
the proper inquiry is whether the regulated individuals’ decision not to purchase
affects commerce in the first place. Otherwise, Congress could mandate any
decision—about activity or inactivity, economic or noneconomic—because that
compelled decision would always be deemed to have a beneficial commercial
effect compared to the regulated entity’s preferred decision.

For example,

Congress could mandate that all local high-schools provide advanced science
classes, by finding that the contrary curricular decision is an “economic decision”
not to purchase the necessary laboratory equipment. But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at
564. In short, as the district court correctly held, “[t]he problem with this legal
rationale … is it would essentially have unlimited application,” because “[t]here is
quite literally no decision that, in the natural course of events, does not have an
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[aggregate] economic impact of some sort.” RE 2054.
Nor can the “economic decision” not to purchase health insurance be legally
or factually distinguished as “unique” because of the “cost-shifting” that occurs
when some uninsured individuals subsequently obtain healthcare without paying.
U.S. Br. 34-37. Most fundamentally, if “economic decisions” not to purchase a
product were deemed “economic activity” under the “substantial effects” doctrine,
then Congress would have “plenary power” over all such decisions, whether or not
they involved “unique” “cost-shifting.” Darby, 312 U.S. at 115; Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 559-60. Thus, once the “economic decision” rationale is sanctioned, courts will
be unable to cabin it to the facts presented here.
In any event, the fact of financial cross-subsidization is ubiquitous in the
modern welfare state. Most relevantly, since insured individuals who “decide” to
lead relatively unhealthy lifestyles shift part of their higher healthcare costs onto
their co-insureds—“cost-shifting” now required by the ACA’s community-rating
requirement—Congress could mandate the “economic decision” to purchase all
manner of healthy products, from broccoli to gym-memberships. RE 2047-48,
2132-33. Furthermore, Congress could mandate purchasing “any and all forms of
insurance,” because lack of insurance inevitably leads to some “cost-shifting”:
individuals who “self-insure and try to meet their obligations out-of-pocket”
always have “the benefit of ‘backstops’ provided by law, including bankruptcy
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protection and other government-funded financial assistance and services.” Id.
2055.

Indeed, even “the costs of violent crime” are “spread throughout the

population” “through the mechanism of insurance,” but Lopez recognized that “the
implication[]” of allowing Congress to invoke such “cost-shifting” would be to
obliterate “any limitation on federal power.” 514 U.S. at 564. Moreover, “costshifting” is not limited to insurance. For example, because many debtor-protection
laws expose GM and Citibank to potential “cost-shifting” whenever they sell cars
and mortgages to individuals who could default, Congress could force relatively
wealthy consumers to purchase those products, thereby (1) reducing “cost-shifting”
risks from any later purchase “decision” when they were less wealthy and thus
more likely to default, and (2) offsetting “cost-shifting” from similar “decisions”
by poorer third parties.
4.

The “Substantial Effects” Doctrine Cannot Be Expanded To
Cover Non-Participation In The Health-Insurance Market
Without Creating A Federal Police Power

Finally, expanding the “substantial effects” doctrine to uphold the mandate
would establish the plenary regulatory power “the Founders denied the National
Government.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618. As discussed, because all inactivity
will be deemed to substantially affect interstate commerce relative to governmentcompelled activity, Congress would be empowered to require any purchasing
decision—from transportation to housing to education—even if Congress were
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somehow limited to regulating “economic decisions” that “uniquely” facilitate
“cost-shifting.”

Thus, one is “hard pressed to posit any [in]activity by an

individual that Congress [would be] without power to regulate,” “even in areas …
where States historically have been sovereign.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. Indeed,
the CBO itself recognized that the mandate could lead to “a command economy, in
which the President and the Congress dictated how much each individual and
family spent on all goods and services.” 17
Needless to say, allowing Congress to use its commerce power to “create a
completely centralized government” (id. at 557) is impermissible regardless of how
well the States are performing their traditional, police-power functions. Id. at 58183 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, the Government’s assertion that the States are
purportedly incapable of “effectively solv[ing] the problems besetting our national
health care system” (U.S. Br. 46-49) is beside the point.

For example, in

Morrison, a “voluminous congressional record” demonstrated that the States were
exacerbating the obstructions to commerce caused by gender-motivated violence,
by “perpetuating an array of erroneous stereotypes and assumptions” that
“result[ed] in insufficient investigation and prosecution.” 529 U.S. at 615, 620.
Congress nevertheless could not step into the breach, for fear that it “might use the
17

CBO, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health
Insurance (Aug. 1994), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/
doc38.pdf.
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Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between
national and local authority.” Id. at 615. 18
III.

FORCING INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE
IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR PROPER FOR CARRYING INTO
EXECUTION A REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Congress may “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for

carrying into Execution [its enumerated] Powers.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl.18.
The Necessary and Proper Clause confirms that Congress has the “incidental
power[]” to further the “legitimate” “end” of executing its enumerated powers
through “appropriate” “means” that are “plainly adapted” and “consist[ent] with
the letter and spirit of the constitution.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. But the
mandate is neither “necessary” nor “proper,” because it serves an illegitimate
“end” by inappropriate “means.” Thus, the Government’s “resort[] to … the
Necessary and Proper Clause” is nothing more than “the last, best hope of those
who defend ultra vires congressional action.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 923.
A.

The Mandate Is Not Necessary To Serve The Legitimate End Of
Carrying Into Execution The ACA’s Commercial Regulations

The Government contends that “Congress’s power extends to regulation of
even ‘noneconomic local activity’ otherwise beyond the reach of the commerce

18

Moreover, the Government’s disparaging assertion concerning the States’
capabilities is undermined by its own emphasis that “Massachusetts [has] avoided
th[e] perils” that Congress was attacking. U.S. Br. 31-32 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 18091(a)(2)(D)).
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power” where “needed to make [a] regulation [of interstate commerce] effective”;
that power supposedly justifies the mandate because “failure to regulate [the
uninsured] would undercut the [ACA’s] regulation of the [insurance] market.”
U.S. Br. 18, 28, 33. This “effective regulation” argument suffers from the same
fundamental defect as the Government’s “substantial effects” argument, which is
unsurprising since both doctrines derive from, and are limited by, the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Under that Clause, Congress may regulate only activities that
obstruct it from “carrying into Execution” an effective regulation of interstate
commerce. Yet the uninsured do not undercut effective regulation of participants
in insurance markets; they in no way interfere with the complete execution of the
ACA’s provisions regulating insurers, but merely fail to offset the costs that those
fully executed regulations impose on insurers. By ignoring this textual limitation
on the Clause, the Government would eviscerate all constraints on Congress.
1.

At the Founding, “to carry” meant “to bring forward” or “to effect,”

and “execution” meant “performance” or “practice.” See Johnson, supra. Thus,
laws that “carry into execution” commercial regulations are those facilitating the
complete performance of the enacted regulations. “[I]n its most basic sense,” this
“means to provide enforcement machinery, prescribe penalties, authorize the hiring
of employees, appropriate funds, and so forth.”

Gary Lawson & Patricia B.

Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation

31

of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 331 (1993) (“Lawson & Granger”).
Moreover, because “effective execution” is “a legitimate end,” Congress
may also employ “appropriate means” to attack “those intrastate activities which in
a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of” its commercial
regulations. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 119 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at
421). As Justice Scalia’s Raich concurrence observed, this power to eliminate
intrastate barriers undergirds the “substantial effects” doctrine, which “cannot
come from the Commerce Clause alone,” because intrastate activities “are not
themselves part of interstate commerce,” even though their regulation is “necessary
to make [the] regulation of interstate commerce effective.” 545 U.S. at 34-35.
Rather, the “substantial effects” doctrine is simply a specific application of
Congress’s general Necessary and Proper power “to make … regulation effective”
by eliminating “obstruct[ions]” to an interstate “regulatory scheme.” Id. at 36-37.
In Raich, Justice Scalia viewed locally produced and possessed marijuana as
an obstacle to “effective regulation” for the same reason the majority held that such
marijuana had a negative “substantial effect” on commerce:

“[a]s the Court

explains, marijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use is never
more than an instant from the interstate market” and is a “fungible commodit[y],”
id. at 40-41; thus, exempting it from Congress’ ban on interstate marijuana
distribution “would leave a gaping hole” due to “enforcement difficulties,” id. at
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22 (majority opinion); accord Maxwell, 446 F.3d at 1218 (possession of child
pornography). The only difference between the Raich majority and Justice Scalia
was that he asserted that marijuana possession was “noneconomic” and thus
excluded from the “substantial effects” doctrine under Lopez; but he then opined
that it was nevertheless reachable under Congress’ more general Necessary and
Proper power to ensure the “effective regulation of interstate commerce,” because
that possession was a barrier to “compliance with [an interstate] regulatory
scheme.” 545 U.S. at 36-41; see also Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v.
Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1271, 1275-77 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding protection
of commercially valueless endangered species because its extinction might negate
protection of commercially valuable endangered species, given “the unforeseeable
… chain of life on this planet”).
The “effective regulation” doctrine discussed in Justice Scalia’s Raich
concurrence thus lends no support to the mandate. Under that doctrine, Congress
may regulate “economic” and “noneconomic activity,” but only if doing so is “a
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce” because the
activity “interfere[s] with,” “obstruct[s],” or “undercut[s]” “the regulatory
scheme.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 36-37. The uninsured’s inactivity, however, does not
negatively affect Congressional regulation of the interstate health-insurance market
for the same reason it does not affect the market itself: the uninsured in no way
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impede or frustrate regulation of market participants.
2.

The Government responds with Congress’ finding that eliminating the

uninsured is “essential” to curing the “adverse selection” problem caused by the
ACA’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements—namely, insurers
would lose money due to individuals who “postpone purchasing insurance until an
acute need arose.” U.S. Br. 28-32; 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). The uninsured,
however, are not “interfer[ing] with,” “obstruct[ing],” or “undercut[ting]”
Congress’ efforts to “carry into execution” those regulations of insurers. Raich,
545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Even without the mandate,
insurers are prohibited from considering pre-existing conditions, and the existence
of uninsured individuals will not create any “enforcement difficulties” in
guaranteeing compliance.

Id. at 22 (majority opinion).

To the contrary, the

premise of “free-riding”—i.e., delayed insurance purchases by sick individuals—
presumes compliance with the ban.
The mandate thus does not “carry into execution” Congress’ insurance
regulation, but solely counteracts the negative effects of that fully executed
regulation.

Having compelled insurers to contract disadvantageously with

unhealthy people whose healthcare expenses will immediately exceed their
premiums, the mandate offsets those costs by preemptively compelling healthy
people to contract disadvantageously with insurers charging premiums that will
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exceed any reasonably foreseeable healthcare expenses.
But under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress possesses only the
“incidental power[]” to use “appropriate” “means” to the “legitimate” “end” of
“carr[ying] into execution” its enumerated powers. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421
(emphases added). The Clause does not authorize Congress to pursue “ends”
outside its legitimate, enumerated powers. Yet critically, it is an illegitimate end to
offset a regulatory scheme’s costs for market participants by mandating
participation by third parties who are strangers to the scheme, rather than barriers
to its effective execution. After all, mandating that non-participants engage in
commerce to subsidize participants burdened only by the normal costs of an
unregulated market is indisputably an illegitimate end under the Clause—since
there is no “regulation” being made “effective” (or “commerce” being
“regulated”)—and Congress’ powers should hardly be enhanced because it created
the costs that assertedly need offsetting. That would be particularly pernicious
here because, wholly independent of the ACA’s preexisting-condition regulations,
the mandate’s avowed purpose and predominant cost-saving effect is the
illegitimate subsidization achieved from forcing healthy individuals into insurers’
risk pools. See supra at 2-6.
Venerable precedent confirms that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not
authorize Congress to reduce a regulatory scheme’s costs for market participants
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by regulating strangers to that scheme.
In United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. 41 (1869), the Government defended a
federal ban on the intrastate sale of certain “illuminating oils” by claiming that the
ban “was in aid and support of the internal revenue tax imposed on other
illuminating oils,” because eliminating competition from the banned oils would
“increas[e] the production and sale of [the taxed] oils and, consequently, the
revenue derived from them.” Id. at 44. Thus, as here, the regulation of certain
individuals was defended on the theory that it would “aid and support” other
individuals burdened by the government’s regulation and thereby make the
regulatory scheme more “effective” (by increasing tax revenues). Yet the Court
unanimously ruled the ban was not “an appropriate and plainly adopted means for
carrying into execution the power of laying and collecting taxes.” Id.
Likewise, when later explaining his McCulloch opinion, Chief Justice
Marshall emphasized that Congress may not increase its ability to collect taxes by
preempting state taxes that diminish the funds of its taxpayer-base:
Now I deny that a law prohibiting the state legislatures from imposing
a land tax would be an “appropriate” means, or any means whatever,
to be employed in collecting the tax of the United States. It is not an
instrument to be so employed. It is not a means “plainly adapted,” or
conducive to[,]” the end.
“A Friend to the Union,” reprinted in John Marshall’s Defense of McCulloch v.
Maryland 78, 100 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) (emphasis added); see also Lawson
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& Granger, supra, at 331 (“To carry a law or power in execution … does not mean
to regulate unenumerated subject areas to make the exercise of enumerated powers
more efficient.”).
3.

A contrary conclusion would impermissibly convert the Necessary

and Proper Clause into a vehicle for Congress to pursue “ends” beyond its
enumerated powers. If the mandate is not a means to accomplishing the end of
regulating the commerce in insurance, but is imposed to counteract the costs
imposed by the ACA on insurers, then the source and justification of the mandate
is not a power enumerated in the Constitution, but the Act itself. Congress’
powers, however, are derived from the Constitution, not its own statutes. While
Congress may broadly regulate interstate commerce under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, it cannot use such regulation to bootstrap additional regulatory
powers otherwise beyond Congress’ reach.
Moreover, as the district court noted, if the Clause could justify regulation
designed “to avoid the adverse consequences of the Act itself,” that would “have
the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or economically
disruptive statutes, secure in the knowledge that the more dysfunctional the results
of the statute are, the more essential or ‘necessary’ the statutory fix would be.” RE
2061. This Orwellian power, quite “[u]nlike the power … to enact laws enabling
effective regulation” that Justice Scalia’s Raich concurrence described, would
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“threaten[] to obliterate the line between ‘what is truly national and what is truly
local.’” 545 U.S. at 38 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68); see also United States
v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1966 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“warn[ing]” against constructions of the Necessary and Proper Clause
under which “congressional powers become completely unbounded”).
For example, Congress could use an “offsetting” power to: (1) compel
individuals to buy healthy foods like broccoli, because the ACA’s communityrating requirement enables free-riding on the healthy lifestyles of one’s coinsureds, RE 2047-48, 2132-33; (2) force Filburn and his neighbors to purchase
wheat, if federal price manipulation caused wheat sellers to make fewer sales, cf.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-15, 127-29; (3) require consumers to dine out, because
federally mandated racial integration caused restaurants to “lose a substantial
amount of business,” Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 297 (1964); and (4)
impose criminal remedies for victims of gender-motivated violence and
educational curriculums for local schools, if the ACA’s substantial Medicaid costs
drain the States’ resources to perform those traditional functions, but see Morrison,
529 U.S. at 615-16, 620; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-66.
The Government is mistaken if it thinks this parade of horribles can be
distinguished simply by emphasizing the alleged “unique conditions of the
interstate health care market” that enable some uninsured to “shift their costs to
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others.” U.S. Br. 34-37.
Most fundamentally, if Congress could compel activity to offset the costs its
own regulatory scheme imposed on voluntary participants, there would be no
legitimate basis for permitting Congress to do so only where “essential” to avoid
“free-riding” in “unique” markets.

As the Government itself emphasizes, the

Necessary and Proper Clause confers “broad power to enact laws that are
‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the [enumerated] authority’s ‘beneficial
exercise.’”

Id. 25 (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956).

Consequently,

Congress could conscript non-participants to offset federally imposed costs on
regulated participants in any market (not just “unique” ones), for any reason (not
just to avoid “free-riding”), if doing so was convenient (not just “essential”).
And regardless, the federally facilitated free-riding in healthcare is not
unique because, as explained above, innumerable federal laws enable individuals
to “cost-shift.” Again, this is vividly illustrated by the ACA’s community-rating
requirement, which—even with the mandate—forces individuals with healthy
lifestyles to subsidize individuals with harmful lifestyles, by prohibiting insurers
from adopting pricing that reflects material differences between these two classes.
Under the Government’s logic, then, Congress could make community-rating
“work better” by requiring that all individuals purchase healthy products, from
broccoli to gym-memberships, as well as quit dangerous activities, from mountain-
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climbing to kick-boxing. Furthermore, even if there were insufficient “unique
conditions” to justify a desired mandate, Congress could, as here, manufacture
those conditions. Thus, the only meaningful way to prevent the “limitation of
congressional authority” from becoming “solely a matter of legislative grace”
(Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616) is to preserve the “effective regulation” doctrine’s
inherent textual limitation to laws that eliminate enforcement barriers.
4.

If the critical distinction between eliminating barriers to enforcement

of regulations and counteracting the undesired effects of executed regulations
nevertheless “appear[s] ‘formalistic’ in [this] case to partisans of the measure at
issue,” that is because such “measures deviating from th[e] form” “of our
government”
are typically the product of the era’s perceived necessity. But the
Constitution protects us from our own best intentions … so that we
may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an
expedient solution to the crisis of the day.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
That said, the uninsured do not disrupt even the general policy underlying
the ACA’s preexisting-condition regulations. The Act’s policy judgment is that
insurers unfairly “scrutinize applicants’ medical condition and history” as part of
“underwriting practices” that, by accounting for individual actuarial risk, “deny
coverage or charge unaffordable premiums to millions.” U.S. Br. 2, 12. Yet
according to the Government, when uninsured individuals who are sick invoke the
40

ACA’s “nondiscrimination” policy against such underwriting, they are transformed
from victims warranting government intervention into “free-riders” warranting
government condemnation.

If Congress believes such future victims are

undeserving of protection, then it can deny such protection to those failing to
purchase insurance by a certain date or age. Conversely, if Congress believes the
ACA’s restrictions are good policy, then there is no reason to exclude future
victims from protection. Moreover, Congress also can require that society as a
whole bear the costs of its charitable policy, by using general tax revenues to
subsidize burdened insurers. But, for the reasons explained, Congress cannot
conscript all healthy individuals merely because some fraction of them will
someday benefit from a regulatory policy that Congress itself adopted.
B.

The Mandate Is Not A Proper Means Of Carrying Into Execution
The ACA’s Commercial Regulations

In any event, the mandate is not a “proper” means of reducing insurance
costs. Laws are “proper” only if they employ “means which are … plainly adapted
to [the legitimate] end, which are not prohibited, but consist[ent] with the letter and
spirit of the constitution.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. There are three critical
aspects to McCulloch’s general standard: a “proper” law is (1) an ordinary method
of execution that respects (2) the States’ sovereignty and (3) the People’s liberty.
The mandate flunks all three factors, since it is an extraordinary regulation that
reaches into the heart of traditional areas of state regulation and compels citizens to
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enter into economically disadvantageous contracts that subsidize legal strangers.
1.

Regulations are “plainly adapted” if they invoke “the ordinary means

of execution.” Id. at 409. The Necessary and Proper Clause merely confirms the
existence of “incidental or implied powers” to execute Congress’ enumerated
authority, and the powers most readily “deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves” are the “ordinary means of execution.” Id. at 406-09, 420-21. Indeed,
that the “customary way of exercising the principal power” “could be deduced” as
an intended “[i]ncidental power[]” was well established in the Founding-era
“doctrine of principal and incidents.”

Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and

Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause 84, 119, in Gary Lawson et al., The
Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause (2010).
Accordingly, McCulloch upheld the Second National Bank because “a
corporation” was a “usual” “means for carrying into execution the great powers
vested in government,” and “a bank” was the obvious corporation “required for …
fiscal operations.” 17 U.S. at 422. Likewise, Raich observed that possession bans
are “commonly utilized[] means of regulating commerce in [a] product.” 545 U.S.
at 26 & n.36. And Comstock, in upholding a civil-commitment statute for certain
sexually dangerous federal prisoners set to be released, emphasized that the
provision was “a modest addition” to, and “reasonabl[e] exten[sion]” of, the
“longstanding civil-commitment system” governing “federal prisoners.” 130 S. Ct.
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at 1958-61.
Conversely, when invalidating a federal law commandeering state officials
to enforce federal gun regulations, Printz observed that the “compelled enlistment
of state executive officers for the administration of federal programs [was], until
very recent years at least, unprecedented.” 521 U.S. at 905. It concluded that
“almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice” “tends
to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted,” because the fact that
“earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power” was good “reason
to believe that the power was thought not to exist.” Id. at 905, 917.
Here, far from being “incidental,” “implied,” “ordinary,” “customary,”
“usual,” “common,” “longstanding,” or otherwise “plainly adapted,” the mandate
“plows thoroughly new ground and represents a sharp break with the long-standing
pattern of federal … legislation.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. And there is good
reason why “[this] mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance
[is] an unprecedented form of federal action.” RE 2039. Previously, the Federal
Government had only ever imposed traditional duties of citizenship on individuals,
otherwise respecting the fundamental distinction in Anglo-American jurisprudence
between free-standing mandates to act and restrictions or conditions on voluntary
conduct. See supra at 12. Even staunch nationalists like Alexander Hamilton
could not conceive of the possibility of commercial mandates: his Report on the
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Subject of Manufactures (1791) listed eleven different ways by which Congress
might encourage domestic manufacturing, but did not include compelling
Americans to purchase such goods. Reprinted in 10 Papers of Alexander Hamilton
296-311 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1966). Indeed, not even the New Deal
Congress thought of supporting wheat prices by mandating that Americans buy
wheat. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-15, 127-29. In sum, the fact that “earlier
Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power” to compel individuals to
contract with third parties is strong “reason to believe that the power was thought
not to exist.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
2.

The degree to which “the statute properly accounts for state interests”

is another important factor. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962; see also id. at 1967-68
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is of fundamental importance to
consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the
assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”). That accords
with Founding-era legal usage, which “suggests that a ‘proper’ law is one that is
within the peculiar jurisdiction or responsibility of the relevant governmental
actor.” Lawson & Granger, supra, at 267, 291 (advancing this “jurisdictional
interpretation” of the Clause).
Thus, Comstock praised the civil-detention statute for “requir[ing]
accommodation of state interests,” as a State retained its “right, at any time, to
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assert its authority over the individual, which [would] prompt the individual’s
immediate transfer to State custody.” 130 S. Ct. at 1962. By contrast, Printz
condemned the statute commandeering state authorities to enforce federal gun
regulations because, where “a ‘Law … for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce
Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty …, it is not a “Law … proper for
carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of the
Federalist, ‘merely an act of usurpation’ which ‘deserves to be treated as such.’”
521 U.S. at 923-24 (citing Lawson & Granger, supra, at 297-326, 330-33).
Notably, that was so even though the commandeering of state officials directly
enforced federal law and no express constitutional provision barred the practice.
Id. at 903-05, 918-19.
Here, the mandate evinces an especial lack of “account[] for state interests,”
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962, by “foreclos[ing] the States from experimenting and
exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of
history and expertise,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Specifically, the mandate invades traditional areas of state regulation, whether
framed narrowly as “the business of [health] insurance,” FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
498 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1990); see also RE 2024, or broadly as citizens’ “health and
safety,” De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814
(1997); see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203.
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Yet, far from “requir[ing]

accommodation of state interests,” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962, the mandate
contravenes (at least) the 26 State Plaintiffs’ views concerning “wise policy,”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Accordingly, it “is a

considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives and
general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens,” City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997), and “the precepts of federalism”
strongly suggest it was not “properly exercise[d] by the National Government,”
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
3.

Just as Congressional solicitude of state sovereignty is an important

factor in whether regulations are “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution” (McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421), so too is the degree to which they
infringe the liberties of individuals.

After all, “the critical postulate” of our

federalist system is that “sovereignty is vested in the people” and that all
governmental “powers are granted by them[] and are to be exercised … for their
benefit.” US Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 794, 821 (1995). That
fundamental precept is reflected in the Tenth Amendment’s admonition that the
non-enumerated powers “are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
U.S. Const., amend. X (emphasis added). “[F]ederalism” and “[s]tate sovereignty”
thus are “not just an end in [themselves],” but rather a means of “secur[ing] to
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” Lopez,
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514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Thus, under the “jurisdictional

interpretation” of the Necessary and Proper Clause invoked in Printz (see supra at
44-45), “laws that are peculiarly within the jurisdiction or competence of Congress
… do not tread on the retained rights of individuals or states.” Lawson & Granger,
supra, at 272.
Among the most longstanding and fundamental rights of Americans is their
freedom from being forced to give their property to, or contract with, other private
parties. During the Founding era, for example, Calder v. Bull warned against
“presum[ing]” that the “people [have] entrust[ed] a Legislature” with the power to
“take[] property from A. and give[] it to B,” 3 U.S. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.),
because, even “independently of the constitution of the United States,” such laws
contravene “the nature of republican and free governments,” 3 Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, § 1393, 268 (1833)
(emphasis added). “Such an act” of conscription is “contrary both to the letter and
spirit of the Constitution” even when solving “public exigencies,” because it
“lay[s] a burden upon an individual, which ought to be sustained by the society at
large.” Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. at 310; see also Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Thus, Congress should not be presumed to have the power to
force “a new contract” on a party “without [his] assent,” for “the assent of all the
parties to be bound by a contract be of its essence.” Cf. Trustees of Dartmouth
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College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 662-63 (1819) (opinion of
Washington, J.). Indeed, “creat[ing] a contract” is “within the same mischief, and
equally unjust[] and ruinous,” as unconstitutionally “impair[ing] or destroy[ing]
one.” 3 Story, supra, § 1392, 267.
These ancient principles endure.

Not long ago, the Supreme Court

invalidated a state law mandating that certain large employers fund novel pension
obligations, reasoning that the law violated the Contracts Clause by “impos[ing] a
completely unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts” on a narrow class
of employers. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 238-39, 247
(1978). More recently still, the Court invalidated a federal mandate that coal
companies pay for certain health benefits of their retired former workers. E.
Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 522-23, 529-37 (plurality opinion).

The plurality

concluded that compelling the companies to cover healthcare costs “unrelated to
any commitment that the employers made or to any injury they caused”
contravened the “fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings
Clause,” id. at 537, and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence reached the same
conclusion under the Due Process Clause, id. at 549-50. In sum, compelling even
wealthy employers to effectively enter into contracts they have eschewed, for the
benefit of their employees or the general public, certainly implicates and
potentially violates the “fundamental principles of fairness” and personal
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autonomy underlying the Takings, Contracts, and Due Process Clauses.
A fortiori, those interests are gravely threatened by the ACA’s mandate,
which forces individuals to contract on disadvantageous terms with wealthier
insurers to reduce insurance costs “unrelated to … any injury … caused” by those
individuals. Id. at 537 (plurality opinion). That is hardly an “incidental or implied
power[].” McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406. Not only would the limited “power of the
Federal Government … be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress
[individuals] into its service … at no cost to itself,” see Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-22,
but “tread[ing] on the retained rights of individuals” (Lawson & Granger, supra, at
272) is not “properly within the reach” of “the Necessary and Proper Clause,” for
doing so is far from “consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,” see
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In short,
Congress’ attempt to “accumulat[e] … excessive power” has predictably increased
“the risk of tyranny and abuse” for “the liberties” of “citizens.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at
576 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
IV.

FORCING INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE
IS NOT A PERMISSIBLE MEANS OF REGULATING THOSE
UNINSURED INDIVIDUALS WHO WILL FAIL TO PAY FOR
HEALTHCARE THEY RECEIVE
Recognizing the mandate cannot be defended as written, the Government

instead defends a hypothetical law that Congress never enacted.

Although

acknowledging below that the mandate regulates the free-standing “decision[]” not
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to buy insurance, RE 1007-09, 2053-57, the Government now claims the mandate
“regulates the practice of obtaining health care services without insurance,” U.S.
Br. 25-28, 38-44 (emphasis added).
The dispositive response to this eleventh-hour shift is that Congress did not
regulate that commercial practice, whether or not it could have. The mandate does
not regulate how individuals pay for healthcare, but only their failure to buy health
insurance. It imposes monthly penalties on individuals who have not purchased
insurance, even if they have not obtained healthcare during that month, let alone
failed to pay for any care obtained. And it does not impose monthly penalties on
individuals who have purchased insurance, even if they have obtained healthcare
during that month without their insurance, and even if they have not paid for it.
Thus, the Act does not regulate or restrict any commerce between healthcare
providers and patients, but only contracts between insurers and customers. This is
hardly a technical distinction. A federal law prohibiting access to healthcare that
the patient will pay for, simply because the patient is uninsured, is a far more
controversial and direct burden on healthcare access than any regulation
concerning insurance contracts. Unsurprisingly, there is no hint in the ACA’s text
or legislative history that people who fully pay for their healthcare without
insurance are a problem to be prohibited, which vividly demonstrates that
Congress never would have enacted the hypothetical prohibition on cash-paying
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patients. Conversely, the hypothetical prohibition does not achieve the principal
goal of the real mandate—i.e., the subsidization of insurers from the compelled
premiums of healthy, non-“free-riding” individuals.
The Government, however, deems it legally irrelevant that the mandate
regulates only the status of being uninsured rather than the activity of procuring
healthcare without insurance. It asserts that many uninsured individuals will not
fully pay for healthcare that they receive and thus will “cost-shift.” Id. 10-11, 2627; but see supra at 4-6 (describing the Government’s exaggerations). And thus it
reasons that Congress may stop this sub-class of uninsured individuals from
engaging in the economic activity of “free-riding” by banning uninsured status for
all individuals, under the principle that “[w]here Congress decides that the total
incidence of a practice … poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the
entire class.” U.S. Br. 27-28, 40-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
But here, the only “practice” that even arguably “poses a threat to a national
market” is the economic activity of uninsured individuals who obtain
uncompensated healthcare, and so that is the “entire class” that may be regulated
to eliminate its “total incidence.” The Government’s argument that it can regulate
the broader “class” of uninsured individuals merely because some sub-class will
engage in activity that may be regulated is plainly wrong and again would
eviscerate all constraints on Congress.

51

The Supreme Court has recognized that, if a “class of activities … is within
the reach of federal power”—i.e., if the “total incidence” of the economic
“practice” that defines “the entire class” “poses a threat to a national market”—
then Congress need not “excise, as trivial, individual instances[] of the class,”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17, 23 (emphasis added), because “the de minimis character of
individual instances” of that validly defined class “is of no consequence,” Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558. This principle has been applied in myriad contexts, such as a
racially discriminatory restaurant’s individual contribution to the aggregate
decrease in the interstate food market, McClung, 379 U.S. at 298, 300-01, and the
individual contribution of an endangered species with little direct commercial
value to the aggregate value of all endangered species, due to unforeseeable
ecological relationships, Alabama-Tombigbee, 477 F.3d at 1274-77.
But no case suggests that Congress may regulate a “class” that is outside
“the reach of federal power” simply because a sub-class engages in a “practice”
that may be regulated. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17, 23. To the contrary, that proposition
is foreclosed by abundant precedent.

It is squarely refuted by Lopez, which

invalidated the blanket federal ban on gun possession near schools, even though:
(1) most guns have crossed state lines; (2) Congress could have regulated that
sizeable sub-class of activity (as it did post-Lopez); and (3) Lopez himself was a
paid gun courier. 514 U.S. at 561-62; 18 U.S.C. § 922(q); Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345.
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Likewise, in Morrison, Justice Breyer’s dissent unsuccessfully contended that the
civil remedy for gender-motivated violence should be upheld because Congress
could “reenact the present law in the form of ‘An Act Forbidding Violence Against
Women Perpetrated at Public Accommodations or by Those Who Have Moved in,
or through the Use of Items that Have Moved in, Interstate Commerce.’” 529 U.S.
at 659.

Similarly, the Supreme Court has distinguished between an

unconstitutional federal civil-rights law that applied to all public accommodations
and a constitutional one that was “carefully limited to enterprises having a direct
and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people,” even though
many of the businesses covered by the former law undoubtedly had the requisite
relation. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250. Indeed, under the Government’s
theory, Congress would never need to use a “jurisdictional element [to] ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the [activity] in question affects interstate
commerce” (Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561), because the Government could always
identify in litigation some smaller sub-class that could have been validly regulated.
In sum, while Congress could have regulated all individuals engaged in the
commerce that is problematic—here, obtaining uncompensated healthcare—
without exempting those whose participation in the practice is relatively minor,
Congress cannot regulate individuals who are not engaged in that problematic
commerce simply because some subset of them may do so at some point in the
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future. There truly would be no “real limits” on federal authority (id. at 565) if
Congress could bootstrap its powers in this way. At an absolute minimum, for all
the reasons explained above, Congress cannot purport to regulate “free-riders” by
instead (1) regulating a vast “class” consisting of nearly every American, (2)
before they have engaged in any commerce at all, (3) by imposing an
unprecedented duty to purchase a commercial product, (4) that is economically
disadvantageous and designed to subsidize third parties, (5) in an area of traditional
state regulation.

A contrary holding would unleash an entirely novel and

unbounded federal police power.
V.

FORCING INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE
EXCEEDS CONGRESS’ POWER TO TAX
Congress may “lay and collect Taxes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The

Government half-heartedly invokes this power, U.S. Br. 50-54, contrary to
statutory text, unanimous judicial consensus (Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, 2011
WL 611139, at *22-23 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) (citing cases)), and the President’s
repeated assurances that the mandate is “absolutely not a tax” (RE 390).
Ultimately, “there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of [a]
so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with
the characteristics of regulation and punishment.” Dep’t of Rev. v. Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994). That is the case for the mandate, which likely explains
why not even Congress called it a “tax.”
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A.

The mandate is not a “tax,” because it is a classic regulatory

requirement (“buy insurance”) enforced by a penalty for noncompliance. “[I]f the
concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or
omission.” United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S.
213, 224 (1996). In adopting that definition, the Court reaffirmed the distinction
from United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931), between a “tax,” as “an
enforced contribution to provide for the support of government,” and a “penalty,”
as “an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.” Id. at 572.
The leading precedents that considered whether monetary exactions were
“taxes” for constitutional purposes applied this distinction. In United States v.
Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950), which upheld an excise on marijuana transfers, the
Court emphasized that the transfers were “not made an unlawful act under the
statute.” Id. at 45. And in Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937), the
Court upheld a statute that taxed dealing in firearms, because it lacked any
“regulatory provisions” indicating that the tax was really “a penalty resorted to as a
means of enforcing [such] regulations.” Id. at 513-14. By contrast, in the Child
Labor Tax Case, on which Sonzinsky relied, the Court rejected Congress’ effort “to
enact a detailed measure of complete regulation” of activities that met “the criteria
of wrongdoing,” but to “enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures.” 259 U.S.
20, 38 (1922); see also United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 31 (1953).
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Under this longstanding law, the mandate is not a tax. The Act prescribes
that covered individuals “shall … ensure” they have insurance.

26 U.S.C.

§ 5000A(a). And it makes anyone who “fails to meet” this “requirement” subject
to “a penalty with respect to such failure.” Id. § 5000A(b)(1). This is the language
and structure of regulation that defines and punishes an unlawful omission.
The Government makes no effort to confront this settled precedent. Nelson
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941)—the Government’s chief authority
(U.S. Br. viii, 50)—did not address whether an asserted tax was in fact one, but
rather involved the permissible scope of state use taxes. Nelson, 312 U.S. at 36366. And while the Government cites Sonzinsky for the proposition that forced
payments to the government are “taxes” so long as they produce “some revenue,”
U.S. Br. 50-51, Sonzinsky hardly established revenue generation as a sufficient
criteria for “tax” classification, which would be absurd since “[c]riminal fines, civil
penalties, civil forfeitures, and taxes” all “generate government revenue,” Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. at 778.
Finally, the Government’s argument would again render federal power
unlimited. The mandate does not require payment of a “tax” incident to some
transaction (such as selling cigarettes or procuring healthcare), because it is
triggered by the inactive status of being uninsured. If that were a “tax,” Congress
could mandate any desired conduct so long as it labeled the noncompliance penalty
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“a so-called tax upon departures from [the mandate].” Child Labor Tax Case, 259
U.S. at 38. It is unsurprising that there is no precedent for such a “tax.” RE 400.
B.

There is a further reason why the mandate is not a tax: the Congress

that enacted the ACA, like the President who signed it, expressly and
unambiguously disavowed the taxing power.
The leading cases all involved statutes claiming to enact a “tax.” Id. 400-02;
Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 43-44; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 37. Moreover, the
Court has emphasized the importance of considering a purported tax statute “on its
face,” both as to the label used and whether other text overcomes that label. RE
401 (discussing Sonzinsky); see also Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36-39; cf.
United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 273-75 (1978) (holding that monetary
liabilities were “unquestionably ‘taxes’” under the Internal Revenue Code at “th[e]
time period that … [was] relevant” for bankruptcy purposes). Thus, as the district
court held, a purported tax “cannot be regarded as one if it ‘clearly appears’ that
Congress did not intend it to be.” RE 390.
The mandate fails this standard. Most decisively, § 1501(b) of the Act—
which imposes the insurance-coverage requirement, sets the noncompliance
punishment,

and

specifies

the

enforcement

mechanism—repeatedly

and

exclusively refers to the exaction as a “penalty.” 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)-(c), (e),
(g). And the Act’s preceding subsection, § 1501(a), grounds the mandate only in
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the commerce power. 42 U.S.C. § 18091. (Although the mandate resides in the
Internal Revenue Code, the Code itself makes that placement legally irrelevant. 26
U.S.C. § 7806(b); see Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 222.)
Moreover, the ACA labeled other exactions as taxes and listed seventeen “Revenue
Offset Provisions,” without including the mandate.

RE 392, 397.

Finally,

statutory context confirms that Congress wanted the “penalty” to produce no
revenue, because Congress wanted everyone eligible to purchase insurance and
thereby avoid the penalty.
The Government attacks a straw man when complaining that Congress is not
required “expressly to invoke its taxing power in the Act itself.” U.S. Br. 52.
Although Congress need not specify its constitutional basis, when it does so and
unambiguously indicates that an exaction should not be considered a “tax,” courts
should take Congress at its word. RE 390, 393-94, 396, 400. Here, Congress
“clearly” indicated in “the plain words of the statute” that it “did not intend to
impose a tax when it imposed the penalty.” Id. 400. Indeed, the Government all
but concedes this by selectively emphasizing legislative history rather than enacted
text. U.S. Br. 53-54; see also RE 391, 398-400; Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *23.
C.

Finally, the Government completely ignores that the mandate’s

penalty would be unconstitutional even as a “tax.” It is a direct exaction, rather
than an excise “upon a use of property, a privilege, an activity, or a transaction,”
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yet it is impermissibly unapportioned. Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 184 (D.C.
Cir. 2007); see RE 214-17, 435-36.
VI.

THE MANDATE AND THE CONCEDEDLY NON-SEVERABLE
INSURANCE REGULATIONS CANNOT COLLECTIVELY BE
SEVERED FROM THE ACA
Finally, the Government insists the district court erred by holding the Act

non-severable. U.S. Br. 55. Although the Government admitted below that “some
limited set of provisions”—including those regulating insurers—“cannot survive if
the minimum coverage provision is stricken,” RE 1765, it maintains that some
others can. Its imprecision in describing which provisions of the 2700-page Act
can be severed illustrates the propriety of the decision below: the mandate and
related insurance regulations are the heart of a sprawling and complex legislative
compromise, and there is no chance the Act—in anything resembling its current
form—would have been enacted in their absence.
The standard for non-severability is well established. After a court strikes a
statute’s unconstitutional provisions, the “remaining provisions” must be
invalidated where “it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those
provisions … independently of that which is invalid,” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010), because it “would not
have been satisfied with what remains,” Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S.
235, 242 (1929). In other words, considering “the scheme … as a whole,” Pollock
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v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895), courts must ask whether
a severed statute would “function in a manner consistent with … the original
legislative bargain,” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987). To
do otherwise “would be to substitute, for the law intended by the legislature, one
they may never have been willing by itself to enact.” Pollock, 158 U.S. at 636.
Accordingly, even where statutes functionally could have operated without their
unconstitutional parts, the Supreme Court has held them non-severable where the
invalid provisions were important elements of the overall statutory scheme. E.g.,
id. at 637 (invalidating taxation scheme because, “[b]eing invalid as to the greater
part,” Congress would not have enacted its lesser portions); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton
R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935) (invalidating pension system because
unconstitutional features “so affect[ed] the dominant aim of the whole statute as to
carry it down with them”).
Under these principles, the mandate cannot reasonably be severed. Looking
at the scheme “as a whole,” Pollock, 158 U.S. at 637, the mandate “so affect[s] the
dominant aim of the statute” that it is inconceivable that Congress would have
enacted this law without it, Alton, 295 U.S. at 362. The mandate is indisputably
“essential” to the ACA’s goal of providing affordable coverage to nearly all
Americans, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I); U.S. Br. 28, because it counteracts the
massive costs imposed by the Act’s other insurance provisions. The mandate and
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these other insurance provisions—which the Government conceded below must
“stand or fall” together, RE 1765— truly are the heart of the Act, and no law can
survive without its heart.
Moreover, not only are these insurance-related provisions the ACA’s
linchpin, but they interact in myriad ways with its other provisions. See, e.g.,
Chamber of Commerce Amicus Br. 17-25. And reinforcing the Act’s “package
deal” nature, Congress removed a severability clause from an earlier House
version. U.S. Br. 59 n.10. Although that removal by itself is not dispositive, “it
does suggest that Congress intended to have the various components of the
[healthcare] package operate together or not at all.” Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele,
857 F.2d 1245, 1267 (9th Cir. 1988).
The Government’s own analysis confirms this point.

Although

“recogni[zing]” the mandate is “integral” to the ACA’s regulation of insurance, the
Government contends that certain other provisions are not so “integrally related.”
U.S. Br. 59. But its (non-comprehensive) attempt to list them produces such a
miscellaneous hodge-podge—e.g., employer-provided rooms for nursing mothers;
nondiscrimination protection for providers refusing to furnish assisted-suicide
services; and Medicare reimbursements for bone-marrow density tests, id. 56-57—
that the Government cannot seriously claim that Congress would “have been
satisfied” with this menagerie of tag-along provisions. Williams, 278 U.S. at 242.
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Ultimately, courts must either recognize the mandate and the concededly
intertwined insurance provisions as a central feature of the ACA, without which
the rest cannot survive, or proceed through several hundred sections and evaluate
each provision’s relationship to one another and the whole. But the latter is
impractical and far beyond the judicial role—even a severability clause (absent
here) “does not permit [courts] to rewrite the statute,” Alton, 295 U.S. at 388.
Thus, because the ACA is unconstitutional at its core, Congress must start over if it
still desires to regulate in this field.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment below.
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